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CURRENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-JuRY TRL4. IN A DERIVATIVE ACTION. Ross v.
Bernhard, 90 S. Ct. 733 (1970).
In a derivative action, stockholders of the Lehman Corporation
charged the corporate directors and brokers with conversion of assets,
gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiffs' demand
for a jury trial on the corporation's claims was granted by the district
court,' but was reversed by the court of appeals on the ground that the
derivative action was entirely equitable in nature.2 On a writ of cer-
tiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the district court's
ruling.3 The Court held that the right to a jury trial attaches to those
issues in a derivative action which would have been afforded a jury de-
termination had the corporation been suing in its own right.4
The Seventh Amendment5 preserves the right of trial by jury for all
issues which were "suits at common law." 6 A corporation's suit to en-
force a legal right was recognized, in classical procedure, as an action
at law carrying the right of jury trial,7 although stockholders were de-
nied the privilege of enforcing corporate rights at law.8 But a recogni-
tion of the possibilities of managerial abuse led the courts of equity to
create relief for intra-corporate disputes between stockholders and di-
rectors on the basis of a trustee theory.9 Yet, when stockholders at-
tempted to enforce corporate claims against outsiders doing business with
the corporation, the trustee theory proved inadequate.10 The problem
1. Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
2. Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
3.' Ross v. Bernhard, 90 S. Ct. 733 (1970).
4. Id. at 735.
5. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VII provides, "In Suits at common law, when the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved
6. As opposed to suits in equity which were denied jury trial.
7. 1 V. BrAcKsrTot , ComtEN-omrAEs *475. Cf. Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 318 (1829).
8. See Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32
N.Y.U. L. REv. 980 (1957). In effect, this meant the shareholder was powerless to
prevent managerial abuse through the courts.
9. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. 1832); Attorney General v. Utica
Ins. Co., 2 Johns Ch. 371 (N.Y. 1817); Foss v. Harbottle, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch. 1843);
Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742). These cases were all tried
in chancery and hence without a jury.
10. Prunty, supra note 8, at 990. As there existed no fiduciary relationship between
directors and outsiders, the shareholder-director relationship alone would not support
a suit against outsiders.
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was resolved in Forbes v. Whitlock" when the court postulated that a
stockholder might, by joining the corporation as a party, exercise the
corporate right in a secondary or derivative capacity.12
As the derivative suit was created in equity,13 the right of jury trial
was denied at both the state 4 and federal levels.' 5 But in DePinto v.
Provident Life Ins. Co., 6 it was held for the first time that a constitutional
right to jury trial extended to legal issues in a stockholders' derivative
action.17 The Court noted that although a derivative suit was historically
an invention of equity, the cause of action was ultimately that of the
corporation, and if the corporation were the plaintiff, a jury trial would
have been available. Since the stockholder sues in behalf of the corpora-
tion, the court reasoned that he also should be afforded a jury determina-
tion of any legal issues presented.'
8
11. 3 Ed. Ch. 446 (N.Y. 1841). The action was dismissed for failure to join the
corporation. The court reasoned that the corporation's interests alone were at stake,
and therefore must be asserted in the corporate name. Cf. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 331 (1855), where it was held that while the corporation had the exclusive
right to sue outsiders, a failure to prosecute even without fraudulent interest on the
part of the directors amounted to a breach of trust.
12. Thus the dual nature of the derivative suit was cast. The crucial point is that
the stockholders must show a breach of trust by the directors, and upon such a
showing they are permitted to accede to any corporate claims and enforce them in a
secondary or derivative capacity. The concept of the corporation as a separate, right-
holding entity was, therefore, merged with the idea that the stockholder had an
interest which required protection.
13. Because jury trials are available only for issues which gave rise to "suits at
common law", the mode of trial is dependent upon historical classification of the action
as legal or equitable. See James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J.
655 (1963).
14. E.g., Metcalf v. Shamel, 166 Cal. App. 2d 789, 333 P.2d 857 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959)_
Cases on the state level are controlled by state constitutions and statutes; the right to
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution has been
held inapplicable to states. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211
(1916).
15. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Linken v. Shaffer,
64 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
A stockholders' derivative suit is an invention of the courts of equity
and cannot be maintained at law . . . . Even if the claim, if sued by the
corporation, would be an action at law, yet, if enforced by means of a
stockholders' derivative suit, it is prosecuted by an action in equity.
64 F. Supp. at 441.
16. 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964).
17. See Ross v. Bernhard, 90 S. Ct. 733, 737 (1970). The possibility that the merged
federal practice might allow jury trial in a derivative suit was noted in dictum by
Justice Clark in Fanchon & Marco Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, 202 F.2d 731, 735 (2d
Cir. 1953).
18. DePinto v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 836 (1963).
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DePinto remained unsupported19 until Ross v. Bernhard"° was decided
in 1970. Both DePinto and Ross relied heavily on two Supreme Court
decisions, Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover2l and Dairy Queen v.
Wood.22 In Beacon, an injunction was sought to prevent an antitrust
action; the defendant counterclaimed for damages, and the Court ruled
that there must be a trial by jury for any legal issues presented. In Dairy
Queen, the plainiffs sought an accounting and money damages. The
Court found that the constitutional right to a jury trial could not be
made to depend upon the pleadings;23 if damages are sought the issue is
unquestionably legal in nature.24 The combined effect of Beacon and
Dairy Queen was to insure a jury trial even where legal issues are merely
incidental to equitable issues.25 But, Beacon and Dairy Queen apply
only to actions which involve a combination of historically separable
suits in law and equity, and therefore, do not apply to stockholders'
derivative actions which were historically not considered a combination
of separable equitable and legal causes of action.26
The Ross decision is based on the premise that the right to a jury trial
should not be determined on the basis of the identity of the plaintiff who
institutes the action;2 7 but more specifically, that a jury trial should be
available to the stockholders under the same circumstances as it is avail-
able to the corporation. 2  By elevating the importance of the con-
ceptually dual nature of the derivative suit, that is, by permitting stock-
holders to exercise corporate rights 'secondarily upon a showing of a
breach of trust by the directors, 29 Ross formulates a "nature of the issue
test" in determining the right to a trial by jury. No longer will this right
depend upon the superficial inquiry of the nature of the overall action.
19. DePinto has been criticized as an "unwarranted extension of the seventh amend-
ment." Note, The Right to A Jury Trial In A Stockholders' Derivative Action, 74 YAa
L.J. 725, 727 (1965).
20. 90 S. Ct. 733 (1970).
21. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
22. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
23. 369 U.S. at 473. Previously, a request for an accounting would have been
controlling, but here the Court extracts the issue of money damages as historically legal,
and therefore triable of right before a jury.
24. Id. at 476.
25. Note, supra note 19, at 736.
26. Id. at 734.
27. 90 S. Ct. at 735. See 49 CORNELL L. Q. 672 (1964).
28. 90 S. Ct. at 740. "We think the Seventh Amendment preserves to the parties in a
stockholders' suit the same right to a jury which historically belonged to the cor-
poration...."
29. See note 12 supra.
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The identity of the plaintiff will now be disregarded, and if the central
issue was historically considered a basis for suit at common law within
the meaning of the Seventh Amendment, the right to trial by jury will
be granted.30
J. W. MONTGOMERY III
Constitutional Law-SPEEDY TRIAL. Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318,
171 S.E.2d 243 (1969).
Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus after being convicted of rob-
bery on a reindictment. 1 His petition alleged a denial of a speedy trial
in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,2
and section eight of the Virginia Constitution,3 and relied upon a Vir-
ginia statute barring prosecution of any person indicted for a felony
who is not brought to trial within a specified period.4 Determining that
the first indictment of the petitioner was defective, the Commonwealth
had secured a second one, thereby delaying the trial seven months from
30. The dissent, written by Justice Stewart, expresses a fear that the majority's logic
will lead to a virtual elimination of all equity jurisdiction, and thereby cause any tradi-
tionally equitable cause of action to be artificially broken down into legal issues. Ross
v. Bernhard, 90 S. Ct. 733 (1970) (dissenting opinion). The majority of the Court,
however, has not indulged in artificial dissection, but rather has given recognition to the
dual origin of the derivative suit. See note 12 supra. The issue test deals only with
truly legal issues which have been procedurally buried in equitable forms of action due
to the identity of the plaintiff.
1. The reindictment was obtained as a consequence of the trial court holding that a
similar indictment, issued against another suspect for the same crime, charged grand
larceny and not robbery as contended by the Commonwealth. Brooks v. Peyton, 210
Va. 318, 171 S.E.2d 243 (1969).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed... "
3. VA. CONsTr. art 1, § 8:
That in criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the cause and
nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses,
to call for evidence in his favor, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury
of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found
guilty ....
4. VA. CODE ANt. § 19.1-191 (Repl. Vol. 1960):
Every person against whom an indictment is found charging a felony and
held in any court for trial, whether he be in custody or not, shall be forever
discharged from prosecution for the offense, if there be three regular terms
of the circuit or four of the corporation or hustings court in which the case
is pending after he is so held without a trial ....
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